Flávio Bolsonaro’s (PL) first-place finish in the first round of Sunday’s presidential election (4) brought Brazil closer to a foreign policy more aligned with the United States. Yet, the balance of power in Latin America could influence the Brazilian electoral contest in the coming months.
International relations specialists consulted by InfoMoney say that this year’s election, already marked by global issues, is likely to be even more influenced by events outside Brazil.
Carolina Pedroso, a professor at the Federal University of São Paulo (Unifesp) and a researcher at the National Institute of Studies on the United States (INEU), assesses that the result of the first round already signals to neighboring countries and to the White House that “there will not be a need for external pressure of great magnitude for there to be a change of government in Brazil.” The senator finished the first round with 47% of valid votes, compared to 45% for Lula.
In Denilde Oliveira Holzhacker’s assessment, a professor of International Relations at ESPM, Washington operates on two fronts.
“There is a level that is Donald Trump’s, who has shown that he is following the election in Brazil, and another that is the State Department’s, which has been acting directly in the relationship with the country and even in the narrative dispute,” she says.
Brazil on the Global Stage
The American interest in Flávio Bolsonaro’s candidacy is related to the ideological alignment between the Bolsonarist platform and Donald Trump’s political agenda.
However, there is also a strategic element at play. For Carolina Pedroso, an eventual victory by the son of former president Jair Bolsonaro could lead Brazil to join the Americas Shield, a security coalition launched by Trump in March.
“Most likely, Brazil would align and integrate into this new security cooperation framework, which opens space for joint operations with the United States Armed Forces and other South American countries,” she states.
Direct adhesion, however, could have effects on Brazil’s relationship with China, the country’s main trading partner since 2009. “How will he [Flávio Bolsonaro] balance this stance of alignment with the United States in light of pressures that could come from Trump himself to have Brazil reduce its ties with the Chinese economy?” Holzacker questions.
The Bolsonaro government was marked by moments of diplomatic tension with Beijing, although the solidity of the economic and strategic relationship between the two countries has limited the impacts of these divergences.
Marco Rubio, the United States Secretary of State, was succinct in commenting on Sunday’s first-round results (the 4th), stating that it was already expected that the contest would be decided only in the second round. An eventual victory, whether Lula’s or Flávio’s, could have effects on the tariffs currently imposed on Brazilian products.
Holzhacker does not foresee an automatic reduction of these tariffs, but she believes negotiations could be more fluid under a Flávio-led government. “Marco Rubio, who today is a strong opponent of Lula’s government, would have a smoother relationship with Flávio himself,” she says.
Yet Lula’s reelection would maintain the relationship marked by frictions, in Pedroso’s assessment. The PT has made the defense of national sovereignty one of the main axes of his campaign. “It would be even more challenging for Lula to maintain this stance and even this discourse of sovereignty defense, because he would have less room to negotiate,” says the researcher.
In light of this scenario, both the PT campaign and the Brazilian government, at the institutional level, have sought to broaden international support to reduce dependence on the United States. “In Lula’s case, there are limits. Therefore, the strategy has been to diversify supports to depend less on the American government,” Holzacker assesses.
International Agenda?
Since last year, the public debate has started to discuss whether foreign policy issues would enter the 2026 presidential race more decisively.
For Pedroso, the national sovereignty agenda favored Lula in mid-2025, after the tariff surge, but lost strength by the vote. “Foreign policy does not always define votes. In fact, almost never defines votes,” she says.
Holzhacker, for her part, assesses that the results this Sunday showed that the Brazilian electorate was mobilized mainly by economic and domestic issues.
“The voter looked at other issues, mainly the economic ones, household debt, the clash and the stance against the STF. This weighed much more than the question of foreign policy,” she concludes.
